NLP Book Review
(Published here with permission from Steve Andreas)
Whispering in the Wind, by Carmen Bostic St.Clair and
John Grinder.
Reviewed by Steve Andreas.
This book states, “Our intention
is to provoke a professional high quality public dialogue among the practitioners
of NLP, as an integral part of these developments,” (p. 348) and it is in
this spirit that I write. I hope this can begin a fruitful and ongoing exchange
that others in the field will contribute their thoughts and insights to. While
I found much of the book interesting and thought-provoking, raising many issues
that are important to the field, I also found a lot of it difficult to understand,
and often contradictory in both form and content. I want to begin by mentioning
the sections that I found particularly useful.
Pattern Verification
The discussion using the example
of modeling spelling (pp. 80-92) is a very clear and much needed presentation
of an important aspect of modeling, and the scientific method in general--how
to use counterexamples to a generalization to enrich and differentiate the
generalization, rather than to falsify it.
Scope and Category
I also appreciated the distinction
made in this book between:
-
Hierarchies of wholeness or inclusion (what I have been
describing as change in scope) in which the change is one of increased,
and/or different information in sensory-based experience (what this book
calls “First Access” FA) and
-
Hierarchies of logical levels which are created as a
result of categories of experience--and categories of categories,
etc. (which this book refers to as f2 verbal descriptions).
Bateson, Keeny, and many other
illuminati of systems theory have completely missed this difference, which
is quite significant and useful in tracking how a person responds in a given
situation, and also as a guide to changing that response.
Changing scope is the basis
for context reframing, which changes the kind and amount of “sensory” information
in someone’s representation. Expanding scope is sometimes called “seeing the
big picture.” Change of scope is the underlying basis for a number of the
content reframing or “sleight of mouth” patterns (justification, consequences,
etc.)
In contrast, a category
is a group or set of experiences. When someone thinks of a category,
they focus on the criteria used for creating the category, and tend to ignore
most of the sensory-based information in the individual experiences in the
group. This is the difference between FA (perception of a specific dog)
and the f2 category “dog.” The category typically elicits a representation
of an “average” or generic dog, rather than a specific dog. Categories provide
the underlying basis for a different set of content reframing patterns, such
as “redescription,” “model of the world,” “apply to self,” etc.
Charles Faulkner and I have been
exploring the many ramifications of this important distinction between
scope and category for the last couple of years. We continue to
find uses for it, and have been teaching what we have learned so far in a
seminar titled “Changing Levels of Meaning and Experience.”
Deletion, Distortion and Generalization
I appreciated the reexamination
of this fundamental topic. (pp. 274-275) Deletion creates distortion, and
this is the process of generalization. In the example of “dog” above,
all the qualities of different individual dogs are deleted, leaving only the
common characteristics of the generic dog that represents the category.
I came to similar conclusions some
time ago. However, I would also add another word, amplification.
While simple deletion results in distorting what is left, study of the neural
nets active in perception clearly show that all of them also amplify
certain signals at the same time that they delete others.
In my new book, Transforming
Your Self: Becoming who you want to be, I model this process of generalization
in considerable detail. (The contents, introduction, two chapters and the
Appendix are on my web site, www.SteveAndreas.com)
Robert Dilts’ Neurological Levels
Dilts’ “neurological levels,” is
another thing that Charles and I have been reexamining. As the book points
out, Dilts’ “levels” do not consistently utilize criteria for either
scope or category inclusion, and sometimes the hierarchical relationship is
reversed. For instance, Dilts places “identity” at a higher (larger)
level than “beliefs.” I think that he probably placed identity higher because
it recursively describes itself, and this makes it much more powerful
in influencing behavior. Curiously, this recursion actually bridges
between logical levels (violating Russell’s “Theory of Logical Types”--more
on this later).
However, since identity is composed
of the beliefs that we have about ourselves, it is a smaller subset
of the much more general term “beliefs,” so it should be at a lower (smaller)
level in a hierarchy than beliefs.
The book also critiques Michael
Hall’s “Meta-States” work, in which levels of experience also figure prominently.
Like most others in the field, Hall misses the difference between scope
and category that has been hidden for years in the experiences described
by the words “meta,” “chunk,” “frame,” and “outcome” in the earlier NLP model.
Since Hall places great value on the use of large categories, his approach
is essentially a conscious mind, top-down, large-chunk, approach, often omitting
FA, the unconscious, and the ecology of the larger system.
History and Epistemology
I and others also found the historical
anecdotes of the early development of the field interesting and enjoyable--information
that only Grinder and Bandler and a few others can provide.
The book includes a fairly large
section on epistemology--how we perceive and know what we know. Although in
many ways this is a pretty standard review of psychophysics and perception,
I have talked with several people who found it very useful.
Modeling Distinctions
The entire book is about modeling,
and it repeatedly bemoans the lack of modeling in the field. “In particular
we refer to the lack of modeling, the very activity that defines the core
of this discipline NLP.” (p. vii) “The vast majority of the actual activity
at present in what is loosely referred to as the field of NLP is application
and training.”(p. 55.) “It is regrettable that creating variations on such
themes seem to be the principle focus of much activity in NLP as opposed to
modeling of new patterns itself.” (p. 225) There is a great deal of discussion
about the difference between NLP modeling, application, design,
variations, and training (pp. 50-56), and in particular the difference
between a new model and an application of an old model.
However, after reading the entire
book very carefully several times, I’m still unclear what the distinctions
are, and which patterns the book would place in each category.
The meta model is described as
both the first model in NLP (pp. 142-163) and also as an application
of the model already existing in transformational grammar.
“The meta model can, for example, be usefully understood to be an application
of the modeling of linguistic patterning inspired by Transformational Grammar”
(p. 51).
The Milton Model is described as
the third model in NLP (pp. 173-183) and elsewhere as the inverse of the meta
model--in other words, the distinctions are (mostly) the same, only the
uses are different, which seems to make it also an application of an existing
model, rather than a new model. In short, no criteria are provided that would
clearly distinguish between these different categories of modeling.
The book states that “The new code
is an excellent example of pure design, a pure manipulation of these variables.”
(p. 51)
OK, let’s take a look.
“New Code” NLP
The “new code” is a general model
for change work, presented as an advance over the “classic code.”
“. . . in the new code, the so-called
resource states are created directly through the participation of the client
in an activity--often a game--that itself creates a high performance state
but one, curiously enough, that has neither history nor content to it. It
is simply a game but a game that activates neurological circuits that serve
as the base for changes in the content selected previously by the client.
The structure of the game itself is designed to ensure that certain characteristics
that are typical of high performance states are present. But once again this
occurs without any particular content and without reference to any historically
experienced states.” (p. 233)
A “high performance state” is characterized
by the Chain of Excellence: Respiration--> Physiology--> State-->Performance.
(p. 233)
“The Change Format for the New Code
-
Select from 3rd position some context in which you experience
some behavior you wish to change/influence.
-
Localize physically this hallucinated context and the
image and sounds of yourself in that context performing the behavior you
wish to change/influence and step into the position of the image of yourself
(1st position) without attempting to change anything--self-calibrate. This
is also the opportunity for the coach to calibrate your present state response
to the context in question.
Separator state
-
Play the game (1st position) or equivalently, enter into
the content free, high performance state (e. g. The Alphabet Game, the NASA
game...)
Spend 15 minutes playing to allow full activation of
the circuits underlying the performance in the game.
-
At the end of the play (15 minutes or until the circuits
are fully activated), the player (1st position) without hesitation and most
importantly without attempting consciously to influence in any way his
experience steps back (into 1st position) into the physical space where
in step 2 occurred--that is, the physical space (on the floor) where he
had located the hallucinated context in which he wanted to change something.”
(p. 240)
Comparison of New Code and Old Code.
In the classic format for integrating
a resource state with a problem state or context, a specific resource is chosen
by the client’s or the therapist’s conscious mind, and then accessed by a
verbal request to recall a past state “Think of a time when. . .” or an “as
if” state “What would it be like if. . .” followed by associating into this
past or potential representation, and then integrating it with the problem
state or context.
In contrast, the new code format
accesses a nonverbal high performance state as a resource, to eliminate or
minimize verbalization and irrelevant historical content. Then while in this
high performance state, the client steps back into the context chosen for
change, unconsciously integrating the high performance state into the chosen
context. In a variation discussed elsewhere in the book, the client asks their
unconscious mind to choose a context to change/improve, so that the entire
process is unconscious, including the results of the integration. This prevents
any possibility of content intervention or interference by the conscious mind
of the client or coach.
Content-free States
In my understanding, all
states have content, so there is really no such thing as a “content-free high
performance state” (p. 239) any more than there is a such a thing as “pure
awareness.” Awareness is always awareness of something, so it
always has some content, and so does a state. A “content-free high performance
state” is simply a resource state in which the content is so different from
the problem state as to seem irrelevant, as in the “alphabet game.” (pp. 242-245).
This process presupposes that a
high performance state will be effective for any kind of problem, skill, response,
behavior, or context, and I think that this “one-size-fits-all” assumption
is patently false. A high performance state for watchmaking is quite different
than one for football. The resource for resolving a phobia, dissociation,
is exactly the opposite of the resource for resolving grief, association.
In most fields, development of
methodology results in further differentiation of more specific methods for
specific applications. At one point in the development of medicine, blood-letting
was considered a cure for all sorts of ailments; now it is used only in very
restricted cases in which someone has too many red blood cells.
In the modeling that Connirae and
I have done, we have determined the characteristics of specific difficulties
and/or skills, and then characterized the resource states that are appropriate
for them (just as Bandler and Grinder did for spelling). Primarily these have
been content-free submodality interventions, but some include specific content
shifts. For instance, in grief people often recall the unpleasant
ending of the relationship through death or other loss, rather than
the valuable relationship that was lost. When this is the case,
it is vitally important to ask the client to change the content of
their representation; resolution of grief is impossible without this content
shift.
Prior to NLP, most change work
was focused on content. One of NLP’s earliest and greatest contributions was
to refocus attention on process (while presupposing content). However,
content interventions are also useful; what is important is to distinguish
between content and process, and determine which is appropriate to change
in a given situation.
Submodality Patterns
On pp. 244 and 265 the book mentions
spontaneous submodality shifts as evidence of the effectiveness of the new
code format. However, there is absolutely no mention of the many very effective
patterns involving direct and rapid change of submodalities that were developed
by Richard Bandler, such as the Swish, the Compulsion Blowout, the Last Straw
Threshold Pattern, the Decision Destroyer--not to mention the classic submodality
phobia cure utilizing double dissociation.
There is also no mention whatsoever
of the submodality patterns that Connirae and I developed for anger/forgiveness,
shame, guilt, adjusting criteria, responding to criticism, internal/external
reference, and aligning perceptual positions.
Since the book proposes a single
change format for all change work as an improvement over other NLP methods,
I would have appreciated at least some examples or discussion comparing the
results of the new code approach with more specific patterns, with specific
follow-up reports of the resulting changes. Is the new code format actually
more effective with phobias than the classic V-K dissociation? Does it work
better to teach someone how to spell? Is it really more effective for a compulsion,
or grief, or shame than the specific submodality methods? Personally, I doubt
it, but I’m quite willing to be shown.
Perceptual Positions (Triple Description)
Perceptual positions are first
on the “partial list of new code patterning” (p. 239), essential ingredients
of the new code.
I want to ask the reader to pause
briefly to respond to a hypothetical proposal from someone that the five representational
systems be relabeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (instead of “visual” “auditory” etc.) I
doubt that you would consider that an improvement, because numbers are a much
more abstract and general verbal coding than words like “visual” that already
have a simple meaning that is reasonably close to sensory-based experience.
The perceptual positions were probably
numbered by following the terms “first person,” “second person,” “third person”
familiar to linguists, but I think this is a carryover from the early modeling
that ought to be revised to make learning easier. For over 15 years we have
been using “self,” “observer” and “other.” This makes
learning much easier, and also avoids other errors that are more likely with
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd coding.
In order to take other position,
you have to spatially leave self position and then
“step into” (p. 251) the other person’s position. As you do this you
have to pass through observer position as you make the transition between
self and other.
Since one has to go from 1st position
into 3rd position in order to get into 2nd position, the number sequence is
misleading. The 1, 2, 3 coding imposes a sequence which is not only functionally
inaccurate in terms of the process that one has to go through in order
to change positions, it is also different than the sequence in which the positions
are usually taught and learned.
Kinesthetics in Observer Position?
The book is very emphatic about
this:
“It is important to make explicit
that 3rd position is not a dissociated position in the sense that there are
no kinesthetics involved in 3rd position. A well-formed 3rd position always
involves strong kinesthetics.” (p. 255)
“We have been astonished to discover
with alarming frequency an interpretation of 3rd position in which participants
in training programs are being instructed that 3rd has no kinesthetics. Little
wonder those participants find it difficult to operate effectively from their
so-called 3rd position.” (p. 266)
In my view, “observer position”
does just that, it observes--a dispassionate observer and nothing more. In
Heinlein’s classic science fiction book, Stranger in a Strange Land
there is the concept of the “fair witness” who reports only what s/he observes,
without conclusions or evaluations. A fair witness would describe a brown
horse as “A horse which appears to be brown on this side.” In the crime novels
and movies of the 30s and 40s the detective would often say, “Just give me
the facts, ma’m, just the facts” (no interpretations). In a carefully aligned
observer position, the person feels the perceptual kinesthetics of
being in that position, but no evaluative emotional feelings about
the events being witnessed, except perhaps a soft feeling of compassion for
the people being observed if they are involved in a difficult interchange.
One possible explanation for our difference of opinion may lie in the book’s
description of other position.
Other (2nd) Position
The book describes 2nd position
as:
“2. adopting the characteristics
and perceptions of some identifiable group. As an example to give the
reader a taste of this, imagine what a well-aged hunk of cheese represents
from the point of view of:
a. a mouse
b. a cow
c. a starving student
d. a lactose intolerant patient
e. a marketing executive
f. a lawyer
g. an accountant
3. systematically shifting
perceptual position from one to another of the three privileged perceptual
positions specified by Triple Description. We would like to note here
that number 2 above could be classified as a generalized 2nd.” (p. 248)
I completely agree that taking
the role of an executive, a lawyer, or an accountant is a “generalized 2nd”
(other position). However, that means that taking the role of a “consultant”
or “director” illustrated in the Angela/Geraldo exchange (pp. 250-256) is
also a “generalized 2nd,” and not 3rd position, as stated.
I understand the great usefulness
of taking on an other position (generalized or not), particularly if that
person has great skill or expertise. However, any such other position will
introduce its content biases, presuppositions, and emphases. These may be
very useful, just as content reframing or other content interventions can
be. However, it inevitably introduces content, as can be clearly seen in the
Angela/Geraldo example, in which the consultant does much more than simply
observe--offering future possibilities, scornful humor, intention, and asking
specific and very directive questions. Every description and example of
“3rd position” in this book is actually 2nd, because they all specify
a person, role, or position other than that of a dispassionate observer, so
of course they will have evaluative feelings.
This is totally inconsistent with
the otherwise clear distinction made in this book between process and content,
and the book’s emphasis on interventions that are based on process rather
than content.
Clean Perceptual Positions
The book mentions the importance
of a “very clean” 3rd position (pp. 234, 255) and “clearly” “clean” and “cleanly”
are used repeatedly (pp. 250, 253, 256, 257) but nowhere does it define operationally
how to achieve a clean position.
Many years ago Connirae modeled
a systematic way to teach clean access to all three positions
with her “Aligning Perceptual Positions” process (published in Anchor Point
in February 1991). This process uses only the (content-free) submodality of
location, and it makes a huge difference in how useful, informative,
and resourceful all three positions are, yet the book makes no mention whatsoever
of this pattern, which provides an operational definition of clean positions.
The book’s lack of an operational
definition for “clean” positions might be excused, but for the fact that it
criticizes Eric Robbie for using terms that he does not define:
“c. Robbie introduces and uses
terminology without definition thereby removing all possibility of a serious
attempt to appreciate whatever insights he is attempting to express--such
minimal operational definitions are a prerequisite for opening a professional
and interesting dialogue publicly within the field of NLP.” (p. 106)
Besides “clean” positions, this
book uses many other terms that are not defined, including, “stalking,” “shunts,”
“characterological adjectives.” “automatic movement to privileged states,”
(p. 239), “NASA,” “trampoline,” (p. 263) and “mental spaces” (p 296). (“Characterological
adjectives” and “mental spaces” may have accepted definitions in linguistics,
but most of the book’s readers will not be linguists.)
The Presuppositions of NLP
This book takes an extreme and
extraordinary position with regard to the NLP presuppositions:
“. . .we find the so-called presuppositions
of NLP are, at best, a pedagogical device to assist people new to the adventure
called NLP in making the required transitions in their thinking to the new
forms of perception and thought implicit in the technology. Unfortunately
presuppositions, like beliefs, are ultimately filters that reduce the ongoing
experiences of their possessors. We personally do not find any value in the
enumeration of such rationalizations (the so-called presuppositions of NLP).”
(p. 202)
Yet the book also states:
“Many students of NLP, especially
in their initial enthusiasm for the effective use of the patterning, seize
upon an epistemologically peculiar (and impossible) goal. The task they set
about to accomplish is to free themselves from all perceptual filters, often
stating that thereby they will appreciate the world without distortion. Such
a naive project is surely incoherent.” (p. 247)
Like it or not, we all do have
presuppositions. Knowing what they are, and that they are arbitrary choices,
allows us to choose to change them contextually, in order to create multiple
perspectives and understandings. Attempting to dismiss them would not eliminate
them, but only blind us to the perceptual and behavioral biases that result
from them!
The book also says:
“Allow us to offer an extended
example of one of these differentiators: specifically, the fourth;
4. neither the agent of change
nor the client is required to believe any set of assumptions to utilize NLP
patterning effectively.
In particular, for example, there
is no need to subscribe to the so-called presuppositions of NLP in order to
benefit from an effective application of the pattern to some problem or challenge.
Normally, these presuppositions include statements such as,
Having choice is better than not
having choice.
All the resources necessary to
make the change the client desires are already available within the client
at the unconscious level.”(pp. 201-202)
Yet elsewhere the book states:
“Further, these patterns [The “chain
of excellence”] had in common a deep trust that unconscious processes when
properly organized and constrained would produce deep, long term ecological
changes in spite of, for example, a client’s declared conscious beliefs that
such changes were impossible. . . . the ability of the unconscious to assess
the longer-term consequences and then, based on this assessment, to make such
selections (desired state, resource or replacement behavior) greatly exceeds
that of the conscious mind.”(p. 236)
This statement (and the new code
format itself) certainly appears to assume that “All the resources necessary
to make the change the client desires are already available within the client
at the unconscious level.” There are many other places where the book presupposes
that having choice is better than not having choice.” (pp. 231, 247-248)
Moreover, the presupposition of
unconscious positive intent, which is included in every list of the
NLP presuppositions I have ever seen, is a fundamental basis for six step
reframing, which the book describes as the bridge to the “new code.”
“. . . the Six Step Reframing format
that we are proposing creates the bridge from the classic code to the new
code. In the new code, we find that: . . .
3. There are precise constraints
placed upon the selection of new behavior(s); more specifically, the new behavior(s)
must satisfy the original positive intention(s) of the behavior(s) to be changed;”
(p. 236)
So while the “presuppositions of
NLP” are dismissed summarily, several of them are used as essential parts
of the “new code!” These contradictions cast a long shadow of doubt over the
rest of the book--does the right brain know what the left brain is doing?
Presentation of Patterning
On pp. 53 and 351 the book (redundundantly)
offers specific and useful suggestions for presenting new models to the field
of NLP, including 1. description of the pattern, 2. consequences of using
the pattern, 3. selection criteria for the use of the pattern, and making
a video available. (p. 352) However, in the description of new code
patterning and format (pp. 239-240) many terms are not defined (as mentioned
earlier) the consequences are not specified, no criteria for selection are
offered, and no video is made available! This is only one of many, many discrepancies
in this book between what is talked and what is walked.
The suggestion of having a library
of videotaped examples of patterns available to the field for study is a particularly
good one, to provide sensory-based examples of the actual use of patterns.
People’s descriptions of their work are often very different from what
they actually do (e.g. Virginia Satir). This is one of the reasons that Connirae
and I have been producing videotapes for the last 21 years--so that people
could see and hear samples of exactly what we were doing and writing about.
Years ago we produced some videotapes of Grinder’s training, but the last
Grinder video that I am aware of was produced about 18 years ago.
Russell’s “Theory of Logical Types”
This book is very clear that logical
levels are created by inclusion of logical categories within larger, more
encompassing categories. However, I found the discussion of logical types
confusing. It defines two sets as being of the same logical type if there
is isomorphic mapping between them. (pp. 295-301) But since no use whatsoever
is given for the term “logical type,” I have no idea how this proposed distinction
is of any use.
Bertrand Russell used the term
“logical types” interchangeably with logical levels, in declaring that a class
(at one logical level) cannot also be a member of itself (at a smaller level).
G. Spencer Brown in the preface
to Laws of Form (1974) has shown that Russell’s theory of logical types
is not only unnecessary, but if accepted, would deprive us of the branch of
mathematics dealing with imaginary numbers, which is very useful in electronics
and in calculations involving sine waves and other trigonometric functions!
The theory of logical types would make impossible the many useful self-referential
(and sometimes paradoxical) messages which people do, in fact, make and respond
to. It would also outlaw important and interesting phenomena such as the self-concept,
which describes itself recursively, including itself in its description.
The theory of logical types (and
any conclusions derived from it by Bateson, Dilts, Hall and others) was declared
“brain-dead” by Bertrand Russell himself in 1967, as reported by G. Spencer
Brown (also in the preface to Laws of Form): “The theory was, he said,
the most arbitrary thing he and Whitehead had ever had to do, not really a
theory but a stopgap, and he was glad to have lived long enough to see the
matter resolved.” Please let us hear no more about the “Theory of Logical
Types.”
Language and Organization of the Book
Whispering would be a great
challenge to an editor in language, punctuation, and organization of topics.
For example, the fifteen pages of notes (pp. 105-119) for Chapter 3,
Part I, could all have been integrated into the chapter instead of being dumped
at the end. The chapter is not quite 3 times as long as the notes! Many topics
are broken up and scattered throughout the book, and as already noted, often
contradictory statements are made about the same topic.
The language used in the book is
usually very academic and overly complex, for instance, the following sample.
(I challenge the reader to read it once, and then summarize its meaning!):
“1. the meta model is a set of
epistemological operations designed to verbally challenge (e.g. through specification)
the mapping (f2) between FA and our mental maps as well as the internal logic
of the language system itself (e.g. cause-effect relations) as it forms a
base for the generation of linguistically mediated mental maps that guide
behavior. A systematic application of this set of verbal patterns leads
precisely and efficiently to the identification of the FA events (the reference
experiences) that are the source of the representations to be changed to achieve
the client’s goals.” (p. 198)
I would probably translate this
paragraph into ordinary English something like the following:
“People respond to events based
on their internal pictures, sounds and feelings. They also collect these
experiences into groups or categories that are labeled with words. The meta-model
is a method for helping someone go from the information-poor word maps back
to the specific sensory-based experiences they are based on. It is here in
the information-rich specific experiences that useful changes can be made
that will result in changes in behavior.”
Epistemology
Since epistemology is how we know
and test knowledge, it seems to me to be an error to think of the meta-model
as “a set of epistemological operations” as mentioned above. The meta model
simply translates from f2 into FA (just as one can translate a sentence from
French into English) without making any epistemological statement about the
truth of either one. The meta-model can be (and often is) taught as a set
of practical techniques, without even a methodology to guide its use, much
less an epistemology.
Incongruence
The book has very harsh
words for teachers who are incongruent:
“1. There were a number of extremely
well-trained practitioners of NLP who were themselves clearly capable of miracles
(relative to the capabilities of other systems of change work) with clients;
however it apparently had never occurred to them (or perhaps they simply had
chosen not) to apply the patterning to themselves--that is, self-application
of the patterning. Thus, my perception was that many of them were incongruent
in significant contexts in their lives--there were portions of their personal
and professional lives that showed absolutely no presence of the choices they
busily assisted others in creating in their lives. I was not happy with this
situation.” (p. 231)
And later we find: “CAVEAT: Messengers
incongruent with the message they purport to bear are not listened to, nor
should they be!” (p. 366) Given the incongruencies that appear in this book,
this statement becomes self-referential (violating the theory of logical types),
paradoxically telling us not to listen to what it says!
I agree that self-application of
the methods we teach is vitally important for all of us, and one result of
this is congruence, a worthy goal. However over the last 67 years I have learned
a great deal from people who were incongruent, and a degree of incongruence
may be inevitable for us mere mortals. We are all still learning, and all
of us have a long way to go.
Learning a new skill or understanding
always results in incongruence, at least initially. So if someone were always
congruent, that would mean that they could never learn anything new! I do
agree that incongruence is an important signal that indicates an opportunity
for further learning, change, development and discovery, and this book provides
more such opportunities than most of us have time to pursue.
Format of the book
As a publisher, I notice that the
book is priced about 2 1/2 times higher than other comparable books. At that
price it should at least have a color cover and an index! The small discounts
offered make it extremely unlikely that a bookstore will stock it, since a
bookstore needs at least a 40% discount to break even (They may “special order”
it as a courtesy to a customer). The paragraphing and indentation could be
greatly improved, and the bold-faced type used throughout the book is the
equivalent of shouting (not whispering).
Summary
The foregoing is only a small sample
of the topics in this book, but it is already more than this article has space
for. The topics raised are important, and deserving of further discussion
and clarification. I wish that they were presented in a form that is more
user-friendly, so that more people would be willing to read them, and therefore
be able to think about them carefully and respond to them.
Given the many kinds of difficulties
I had in reading and understanding this book, I find it difficult to imagine
that the authors took other position with the reader. I think that few people
will buy Whispering. Of those who do, few will manage to read it. And
of those who read it, very few will be able to understand it.
I hope that this review can be
a contribution to the kind of friendly and respectful professional dialogue
that the book calls for, and that can strengthen and further develop the field.
There is some nourishing meat here, but also a lot of gristle that needs to
be cooked and chewed very thoroughly before swallowing, and quite a lot of
much less nourishing skin, feathers, teeth, claws, and bone that is best set
aside.
Steve Andreas has been learning, training, researching
and developing NLP patterns for the last 25 years. He is the author of the
recent book, Transforming Your Self: Becoming who you want to be,
Virginia Satir: The Patterns of Her Magic, and an anthology, Is
There Life Before Death. Steve is also is co-author (with his wife, Connirae)
of Heart of the Mind and Change Your Mind--and Keep the Change.
He lives with his wife and three teenage sons in the foothills of the Rocky
Mountains near Boulder, Colorado. 1221 Left Hand Canyon Dr. Boulder CO 80302
andreas@qwest.net
www.SteveAndreas.com
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